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1NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 09-4732
___________
MAURICE OPARAJI,
                                                                       Appellant
v.
NORTH EAST AUTO-MARINE TERMINAL; A.T.I. U.S.A., INC.; RICARDO
FURFARO; HUAL NORTH AMERICA, INC., a/k/a/ AUTOLINERS INC.
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civ. No. 04-cv-06445)
District Judge:  Honorable Katharine S. Hayden
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 24, 2010
Before: RENDELL, HARDIMAN and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 26, 2010)
_________
 OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Maurice Oparaji appeals pro se from the District Court’s post-judgment order
denying what we construe as his motion to hold defendants in contempt.  We will affirm.
     The District Court entered two orders in this respect on October 23 (Dist. Ct. Docket1
Nos. 55 and 56).  The second order is captioned as an “amended order” and merely
amended the designation of one of the defendants contained in the first order.  All
references herein to the October 23 order are to the amended order, Docket No. 56.
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I.
Oparaji filed a complaint alleging that North East Auto-Marine Terminal
(“NEAT”), among others, breached a contract with him to ship a truck fitted with
dredging equipment to Nigeria and committed various related torts.  Oparaji apparently
had delivered the truck to NEAT, but defendants had not shipped it to Nigeria.  On
October 23, 2007, a jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants on all counts.  
That same day, the District Court entered an order (1) noting that Oparaji’s truck
remained on NEAT’s property, (2) directing the United States Marshals Service to
supervise the return of the truck to Oparaji, and (3) requiring the parties to cooperate with
the Marshal’s directions.   Oparaji filed a motion to stay execution of that order.  The1
District Court denied the motion, noting that defendants had no duty to store Oparaji’s
truck and that its order merely required Oparaji to assume responsibility for his own
property.  See Oparaji v. N.E. Auto-Marine Terminal, No. 04-6445, 2007 WL 3226605, at
*1 (D.N.J. Oct. 29, 2007).  Oparaji appealed from the jury verdict and the denial of his
motion, and we affirmed in all respects.  See Oparaji v. N.E. Auto-Marine Terminal, 297
Fed. Appx. 142, 146 (3d Cir. 2008).  Among other things, we noted that Oparaji “failed to
provide any legitimate basis for vacating the District Court’s order” regarding the return
3of his truck and rejected his argument that “he should not have to deal with storing the
vehicle, which is indisputably his property.”  Id.
Approximately one year later, Oparaji filed the document at issue here, which he
captioned merely as a “Judgment.”  This time, Oparaji asserted that defendants had failed
to return his truck as purportedly required by the District Court’s October 23 order and
requested a monetary judgment in the amount of $198,750.  Defendants filed declarations
in opposition, asserting that Oparaji had failed to cooperate with several requests by the
Marshal to facilitate the return of his truck, that NEAT stored Oparaji’s truck for more
than one year after the District Court’s order before ceasing business and closing its yard
in November 2008, and that Oparaji’s truck had thereafter been “scrapped” by a third-
party towing company.  Defendants also requested that the District Court enjoin what they
characterized as further vexatious litigation by Oparaji.  Oparaji did not contest any of
defendants’ averments.
On December 8, 2009, the District Court entered an order captioned as an “order
noticing plaintiff with respect to further filings in the within litigation.”  The District
Court noted that its October 23 order contemplated that Oparaji would retrieve his truck
from NEAT and merely directed the Marshal to supervise that retrieval.  The District
Court further concluded that “[t]o the extent the plaintiff is exercising whatever rights to
get his truck back that could be inferred from the Court’s order . . . they were long ago
extinguished when he failed to make arrangements to pick up the truck[.]”  Finally, the
4District Court noted defendants’ requests for an injunction against further litigation, but
instead merely put Oparaji “on notice that [it] will impose Rule 11 sanctions as required
in the event of further meritless filings.”  Oparaji appeals.
II.
We construe Oparaji’s “Judgment” as a motion to hold defendants in contempt and
award monetary damages as compensation for their purported violation of the October 23
order.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review the denial of the motion. 
See Berne Corp. v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 570 F.3d 130, 135 n.10 (3d Cir.
2009).  We do so for abuse of discretion, and may reverse “only where the denial is based
on an error of law or a finding of fact that is clearly erroneous.”  Roe v. Operation
Rescue, 54 F.3d 133, 137 (3d Cir. 1995).  “We review a district court’s interpretation of
its own order for abuse of discretion” as well.  Gibbs v. Frank, 500 F.3d 202, 206 (3d Cir.
2007).
We perceive no abuse of discretion here.  Oparaji argues that the District Court
erred in failing to hold defendants in contempt because the October 23 order required
them to return the truck or initiate its return.  As the District Court explained, however,
the October 23 order contemplated that Oparaji would assume responsibility for the truck,
which he resisted doing for almost two years.  The order did not require defendants to
initiate that process or store the truck indefinitely until Oparaji decided to do so.  To the
contrary, the order required only that they cooperate with the Marshal’s directions in
     Oparaji raises several arguments that he did not present to the District Court.  He2
argues, for example, that defendants committed the tort of conversion by “scrapping” his
truck and that a new trial is required because defendants’ assertion that his truck has been
“scrapped” reveals that they misled the jury about the presence of his truck on NEAT’s
property.  These arguments are beyond the scope of this appeal, but because the second
argument concerns proceedings in the District Court we note that it lacks merit.  NEAT
asserted in the District Court that Oparaji’s truck was “scrapped” by a third-party towing
company at some point after NEAT ceased doing business in November of 2008, which
was over one year after the jury entered its verdict.  That assertion has no bearing on the
location of Oparaji’s truck at the time of trial.
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supervising the truck’s return.  Oparaji does not allege that defendants failed to cooperate
with the Marshal in any respect or otherwise impeded his ability to retrieve the truck.  Nor
does he challenge the District Court’s finding that he failed to make any arrangements to
retrieve the truck himself.
Oparaji also argues that the District Court’s ruling deprived him of property
without a hearing, but the ruling did nothing of the kind.  Instead, it merely denied his
request for monetary sanctions for defendants’ purported violation of the October 23
order.  Finally, Oparaji argues that the District Court impermissibly enjoined him from
future litigation.  The District Court, however, merely noted the possibility of sanctions in
the future, and did not abuse its discretion in doing so.2
Accordingly, we will affirm.  In addition to affirmance, certain defendants appear
to request that we enter an order enjoining Oparaji from further vexatious litigation.  We
decline to do so at this time, but we will tax costs against Oparaji pursuant to Fed. R.
App. P. 39(a)(2).
